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Document No. _____

NO CHANGE in Class. ☐

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Class. CHANGED TO: TS S (C)

DDA Memo, 4 Apr 77

Auth: DDA REG. 77/1723

Date: 020278 By: 025

27 NOV 1956

FO6-3796

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director (Support)

SUBJECT : Staffing of Conclusions Contained in Report of Survey
of Overseas Training

1. Approximately six months have elapsed since the attached report of survey of overseas training was forwarded to the Director of Central Intelligence. At that time, the Director of Training was requested to staff out the conclusions contained therein and submit his recommendations to the Director of Central Intelligence.

2. Of the seven conclusions made in my report, action has been taken with regard to four:

a. Modifications have been made in the career management policies of the Clandestine Services to meet the expanding requirement for competent instructors. These changes have been reflected in new or revised [REDACTED].

b. Pay and allowances for personnel assigned to the [REDACTED] Station have been adjusted to a scale of payment comparable to other stations in the Far East.

[REDACTED]

d. The [REDACTED] process of terminating its use of the [REDACTED] as a training site.

3. With respect to the remaining three conclusions, partial staffing out has taken place:

a. The proposal for the organization of an "Action Operations Unit" made to the DDCI in a memorandum dated 29 September 1955 has been re-examined. I propose to submit it at such time as the Clandestine Services are able to provide qualified personnel to staff the cadre within existing ceiling limitations, and without prejudice to the normal instructor rotation program.

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b. A re-examination of the criteria now used for releasing training materials for field use has been worked out partially with the CI Staff of the Clandestine Services. As a result, certain additional categories of material are being released for field use.

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c. The decision to send a senior staff training officer to [REDACTED] provide the necessary technical supervision of all Agency training in the Far East and Southeast Asia is being held in abeyance until it is determined what future role that Support Base will have in the revised scheme of operations for the area.

In view of the actions taken above, no recommendations are appropriate at present with regard to the last three conclusions.

SIGNED

MATTHEW BAIRD
Director of Training

Attachment:
Report of Survey of
Overseas Training dtd 7 May 56

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OTR/PPS/[REDACTED] mls (27 Nov 56)

Distribution:

- 0 & 1 - Addressee w/attach.
 - 1 - DTR w/cy attach. ✓
 - 1 - PPS
- [REDACTED]

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY OFFICIAL ROUTING SLIP					
TO	NAME AND ADDRESS	INITIALS	DATE		
1	DD/S	LKW	6/1/56		
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6					
ACTION		DIRECT REPLY		PREPARE REPLY	
APPROVAL		DISPATCH		RECOMMENDATION	
COMMENT		FILE		RETURN	
CONCURRENCE		INFORMATION		SIGNATURE	
Remarks: The Director has noted the attached Report of Survey of Overseas Training prepared by Col. Baird and has asked that the conclusions contained therein be staffed out and recommendations submitted to him (DCI)					
FOLD HERE TO RETURN TO SENDER					
FROM: NAME, ADDRESS AND PHONE NO.					DATE
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Document No. 2

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Class. CHANGED TO: TS

DIA Memo, 4 Apr 77

DIA REG. 77/1783

Auth:

Date: 020278

By: 025

7 May 1956

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence

THROUGH: Deputy Director (Support)

SUBJECT: Report of Survey of Overseas Training

INTRODUCTION

The Director of Training, accompanied by a member of the Plans and Policy Staff, OTR, conducted a survey of overseas training activities at the stations shown in the itinerary attached, during the period 25 January - 14 April 1956. The purpose of this trip was to carry out the DTR's responsibilities for the coordination, technical supervision, review and support of all Agency training activities, foreign and domestic.

As a result of the twelve-week visit abroad, I have become more fully aware of the importance, complexity and magnitude of providing support to the overseas training activities of this Agency. It is my intention to prepare a brief separate report regarding each of the stations visited for the responsible Division Chiefs in the Clandestine Services. In this report I will give general coverage to our survey of large-scale paramilitary training projects, problems we encountered regarding support of overseas training activities, the adequacy of training for staff personnel, language training, foreign agency training sites, preparation for wartime training, personnel highlights, and the Junior Officer Trainee activities overseas.

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
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Southeast Asia and the Far East. Technical supervision and guidance by a competent senior training officer would unquestionably enhance the effectiveness of training in the Far East.

As a result of the major training activities being conducted in the Near East, Southeast Asia and Far East, the field problems of selection, preparation, assignment and replacement of instructors have greatly increased. The success of each of these field training projects is essentially dependent upon the quality of instructor assigned. While it is recognized that instructors from this Office would make effective replacements for those now overseas, present manpower limitations make it impossible to lend this kind of full-scale support. If the Agency is to continue to sponsor large-scale overseas paramilitary training activities, the Action Cadre should be established. This program could serve as an ideal source of manpower for the type of instructor required.

A significant problem confronting stations in the field is the lack of suitable training materials. In a number of instances, it was found that requests for training materials had been dispatched from the field without these requests reaching the Office of Training. In other instances, we found that the training materials selected by the Office of Training in response to field requests had not been released to the field. There is an apparent need for the relaxation of controls now imposed by headquarters on the release of training materials for field use.

ADEQUACY OF TRAINING FOR STAFF PERSONNEL

In our discussions with Chiefs of Stations, senior operations officers and case officers, it was gratifying to note the dissipation of lines of demarcation which once existed between FI, PP and PM. The truly professional officer in the field today is one who has been trained for all types of clandestine activity and who can make an effective contribution to resolving any operational problem.

A case officer who now goes through the operational training at headquarters receives a thorough grounding in "across the board" tradecraft as well as a basic understanding of the responsibilities and functions of the Clandestine Services. This provides an essential

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foundation for further training. This type of training has been a requirement for the majority of the Junior Officer Trainees for the past two years.

It appeared to be the consensus among Station Chiefs that case officers arriving in the field today are basically well trained for their assignments with one serious exception: the majority of case officers still lack training in foreign languages.

We learned that administrative and clerical personnel assigned to small stations require greater familiarity with operational techniques and need more training in "tradecraft" than they are now receiving. Support personnel are frequently called upon in small stations to assist in minor operational roles.

Senior support personnel are considered well qualified in their specialties but require training in the peripheral support functions they will be expected to perform; for example, it is not unusual for a personnel officer to be asked to handle straight administrative matters or advise station personnel on matters of training. We heard of no case, however, where the communications officer, security officer, or the finance officer was not fully qualified for his field duties.

Our discussions concerning the extent and character of the Agency liaison activities with both foreign and United States agencies brought to light the present inadequacy of training for this type of operation. There was general agreement among senior station personnel that there is need for a liaison training program which will include instruction on how to establish, conduct and exploit field liaison arrangements. I would like to take immediate action to remedy this deficiency by the establishment of a course in liaison operations. This step, however, will be contingent upon adjustments in the OTR personnel ceiling and the acquisition of competent instructors from DD/P.

LANGUAGE REQUIREMENTS IN THE FIELD

With the exception of [REDACTED] where foreign languages are seldom used, each station stressed the fact that personnel serving in the field require some competence in foreign languages.

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It was emphasized that the case officer needs a working knowledge of the language of the country in which he operates or, if different, the country to which he is assigned. It was also emphasized that he must acquire this competence before arrival in the field since he will not have sufficient time to devote to intensive language training after he arrives. We did find that all of the stations afford their personnel the opportunity to study foreign languages at Agency expense and that a number of staff employees have taken advantage of this opportunity.

25X1A There appeared to be a wide divergence among the stations as to the manner in which language training programs are carried out. The station [REDACTED] conducts a well-planned program and provides proficiency testing for each of the trainees. The excellence of this effort is primarily due to the Chief of Administration who has taken a personal interest in the success of the program.

Other stations visited were found to pursue this training somewhat haphazardly and station personnel frequently lack guidance as to which of the local schools offers the best training. Supervision is also found to be lacking with respect to the progress made by the trainees.

My previous views concerning the importance of language training and the necessity for language competence among Agency personnel serving overseas were confirmed over and over again on this trip.

TRAINING SITES



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since my visit in September 1953 are worthy of special commendation. Under the leadership of the present Chiefs of Station and Training, there has developed a fine esprit de corps among the station complement and their dependents. The physical appearance of the area has taken on an air of orderliness and care. The support and training staffs have combined their ingenuity and have done much to rehabilitate classrooms and field training facilities. Under competent supervision, the quality of training was found to be much improved. There is still a lack of adequate training materials although requests for needed materials have been forwarded to headquarters. The major problem facing this base is obtaining competent instructor replacements. The replacement problem is further complicated by the fact

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FIELD PERSONNEL

We scheduled time at each of the stations visited to discuss training and career management problems with those who were interested. A great many individuals availed themselves of this opportunity. The individual's next assignment is usually his primary concern. I was impressed by the fact that both senior and junior station personnel would welcome a "directed assignment," particularly if such assignments were in consonance with a planned career program. This kind of personnel management would do away with "walking the halls" following a return to Washington. It is apparent that, in the absence of "directed assignments" and a personnel placement policy of career development, the average employee is not going to prepare himself linguistically for his next assignment, since he has no way of knowing where he is going to be.

Field personnel expressed a great deal of interest as to whether career service was working, and we received several questions concerning the value of the field reassignment questionnaire.

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Several inquired about the possibility of an assignment in the Office of Training and the probable effect of such an assignment on their careers in the Clandestine Services. From their questions we concluded that the DD/P position regarding the desirability of Clandestine Services' personnel accepting a rotational assignment with the Office of Training was generally unknown in the field.

It was found that the Personnel or Administrative Officer is frequently called upon for guidance on training matters. In general, these officers are not sufficiently informed to provide the guidance required. In the future, this Office will attempt to brief Personnel and Administrative Officers concerning OTR capabilities and limitations before they go to the field.

JUNIOR OFFICER TRAINEES

With one notable exception, all Station Chiefs spoke highly of the JOTs assigned to them and of the program. However, there was some misunderstanding encountered in the field regarding the slotting and training of Junior Officer Trainees. I took responsibility for providing the following guidance to stations at which JOTs are now assigned with the understanding that my decisions would remain in effect unless changed by headquarters authority. I advised that:

1. A JOT in the field may be retained on the JOT Table of Organization or double-slotted against a field T/C position until such time as a field position vacancy exists for which the JOT is qualified. The JOT will then be assigned to this vacancy and no other replacement will be requested.
2. The tour of the JOT at the station will be of the same duration as all other CIA employees assigned.
3. The JOT will not necessarily be rotated from one assignment to another during his tour in the field merely for the sake of training, but will be given typical case-officer field experience commensurate with his ability.
4. The JOT is required to devote a part of his time to serious study of languages and should be given the opportunity to do so.

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I have reached the conclusion from my observations on this trip that Junior Officer Trainees will be more effective if they have completed a successful tour overseas before embarking on a one- to three-year intensive language or area program. Then, this type of training should be planned for the JOTs who demonstrate better than average language aptitude and are successfully assessed for long-term career motivation.

CONCLUSIONS

As a result of my trip, I have reached certain general conclusions on which I intend to base recommendations for your approval. These recommendations, however, cannot be made until preliminary staff work and coordination have been completed.

I have concluded that:

1. There are modifications necessary in the career management policies of the Clandestine Services if the Agency is to meet the expanding requirements for competent instructors. These modifications should include:

a. Notification to field personnel regarding the desirability of a rotational assignment into the Office of Training.

b. The assignment of "qualified" potential instructors to the Office of Training, on a "directed" basis, whenever such assignments are found to be in consonance with the individual's career development plan.

c. The enrollment of qualified operational personnel into intensive language programs in preparation for field assignments involving instructional as well as operational responsibilities.

2. The "proposal for the organization of an Action Operations Unit," made to the DDCI in memoranda dated 11 August and 29 September 1955, should be reexamined with a view to the establishment of an Action Operations Unit as a temporary reservoir for instructor replacements for those now engaged in large-scale paramilitary training programs.

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25X1A 3. The pay and allowances for personnel assigned to the [REDACTED] should be readjusted to a scale of payments comparable to other stations in the Far East.

4. The responsibilities of the Agency with regard to the training [REDACTED] require clarification, particularly insofar as the support responsibilities of this Office are concerned.

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6. The criteria now used in determining whether training materials may be released for field use should be reexamined, since the restrictions now imposed seriously limit the field training effort.

25X1A 7. It will be desirable for a senior staff training officer to be assigned to the Staff of the Chief of the FE Support Base on the [REDACTED] to provide the necessary coordination and technical supervision of all Agency training in the Far East and Southeast Asia.

WBS
SIGNED

MATTHEW BAIRD
Director of Training

Attachment: Itinerary

cc: 1 - DDCI
2 - DD/S
1 - DD/P
2 - DTR ✓

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MB:lbc

Except for pp. 1, 10 & 11, this report same as originally submitted to DD/S on 7 May 56.

New report resubmitted to DD/S on 23 May 56. Latter calls for

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conclusions instead of "recommendations."